Page 104 - 《社会》2025年第4期
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地位匹配与庇护共享:宋代国家构建下的精英家族婚姻
marriage modes under these two logics. The research finds that in the early stage of
transition from a traditional to a modern state, social mobility increases but state
power remains relatively limited. Elite families exhibit low risk preference and
conservative behavior patterns. Their marriage strategies are mainly manifested as
negative matching based on ascribed status and positive matching based on achieved
status from the perspective of individual traits, as well as the continuation of
hereditary patronage relationships and the suppression of oppressive patronage
relationships from the perspective of relational structure. As the nation building process
accelerates, the expansion of state power dominated by utilitarianism, centralization
and institutionalization influences the reproduction strategies of the elite by adjusting
the social redistribution mechanism, prompting them to adopt more open and risk鄄
taking marriage strategies:on the one hand, increased social openness reduces
homogeneous marriages among elite families based on positive status matching, and
on the other hand, the expansion of state power strengthens the external pressure
and internal demand for elite families to focus on clans, hence promoting the
positive influence of sheltered relationships among previous generations on the
intermarriages of subsequent generations. The research findings reveal the complex
picture of the interaction, coordination, and integration between the “state” and
the“family” in the early state building process in China.
Keywords:elite family, marriage, state building, Song Dynasty, exponential
random graph model
一、 引言
国家构建(state building)是当今世界最重要的问题之一,因为软弱
或失败的国家是贫穷、战乱、腐败、恐怖主义等众多严重问题的根源(福
山,2017:7)。在国家现代化的发展过程中,以血缘关系为核心的亲属家
族制度通常被视为侵蚀国家构建根基的主要因素。 经典的国家构建理
论认为,通过争夺国家权力、攫取国家资源、重塑权威合法性以及共铸
情感与责任共同体等方式,精英家族的成员们竭力捍卫自身的利益,在
客观上阻碍了现代国家的形成。 然而,新近的一些研究表明,借助身份
与利益转换、整合社会和文化资源、政治与社会动员、公共物品供给、亲
属社会网络的移植以及嵌入与再运作等途径, 精英家族有可能在维系
自身地位的同时催生出现代国家的制度基础( Padgett and Mclean,2006;
· 97·

