Page 9 - 《社会》2022年第5期
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社会·2022·5

             “administrative outsourcing” that refers to the assignment of public affairs by the
              imperial state to social groups (e.g., clans and guilds) or individuals (local
              gentry) outside the government system. In this administrative outsourcing process,
              the social groups or individuals certified as subcontractors enjoy certain privileges
              and honors, or even semi鄄public identities, but at the same time are subjected to
              government supervision and hierarchical control, which is different from market鄄
              based outsourcing. In contrast, internal administrative subcontracting involves the
              higher鄄level government assigning public affairs or other government targets to the
              lower鄄level government in a subcontracting way. This study focuses on the
              correspondence between the features of state governance in the domains such as
              resource extraction, regime stability maintenance, local public goods provision,
              and internal civil internal order (e.g., clans and guilds), and the specific modes
              of administrative outsourcing. By so doing, the underlying mechanism of state鄄
              society interactions in the Chinese imperial system is uncovered. We argue that the
              specific modes of administrative outsourcing are determined by tradeoffs between
              governance risks and administrative costs associated with specific governance
              domains as well as the fiscal constraints of the state. As a result of such tradeoffs,
              we have observed a spectrum of governance modes of administrative outsourcing
              varying in combinations of government control and civil autonomy across governance
              domains. For instance, in high governance risk domains such as resource extraction
              and social order maintenance(taxation and public security), numerous local semi鄄
              public agents were designated as subcontractors under strong controls from the
              government. For the domain of local civil order with relatively low governance risk
              but potentially high administrative costs if the government would exercise direct
              controls, civic organizations such as clans, guilds, and merchant clubhouses were
              offered a high degree of autonomy over their internal affairs with only contingent
              interferences from the government. This paper suggests a new notion of“one body,
              many faces” to recapitulate the overall nature of the state鄄society relationship of
              imperial China, to offer a new analytical framework to reconcile diverse theoretical
              characterizations existing in literature, and to help understand the paradoxical
              combination of the unity of state power and the pluralism of state governance in the
              Chinese imperial system.
              Keywords:state鄄society relations, administrative outsourcing, traditional state
              governance, imperial China





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